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Abstract  
 
In a green goods market a combination of individual and corporate social responsibility 
may lead to the internalization of externalities. This economics experiment implements a 
market for green credence goods in the presence of externalities on other buyers and 
explores whether a combination of individual and corporate social responsibility may lead 
to the internalization of externalities. Under information asymmetry, we observe 
widespread false claims and an apparently pro-environmental market, when in reality green 
goods are sparingly sold. When a credible label is possible or when the information 
asymmetry is removed, the provision of actual green goods increases, but is roughly 20% to 
25% of the market share. While this share is non-negligible, the niche market that ensues 
does not ensure that less environmentally damaging consumption options will be 
widespread, nor that social welfare will be maximized once the information asymmetry is 
removed. 
 
Keywords: externalities; credence goods; labels; prosocial behavior; economics 
experiments. 
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1 Introduction 
Traditionally, in economics, externalities are identified as market failure, given that 
producers or consumers do not internalize the total social costs or benefits in their 
production or consumption choices. However, as noted by Bénabou and Tirole (2010) there 
are several examples of socially responsible behavior whereby individuals and firms do 
indeed voluntarily consider externalities in their choices (respectively individual and 
corporate social responsibility). The focus of our paper is on one such example namely the 
market for green goods. Green goods are produced with often more expensive technologies 
but mitigate negative environmental impacts, that is reduce externalities. For green goods to 
be demanded, this means consumers need to care about the negative externality imposed on 
the environment and on others, and are voluntarily willing to pay for its alleviation. On the 
other hand, producers might also opt for greener technologies, as a reflection of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Therefore in the presence of a combination of individual and 
corporate social responsibility, it would be possible for the market to voluntarily reduce 
externalities through the supply and demand of green goods.  
In most cases the environmental friendliness of green goods cannot be accessed beforehand 
by the consumer and in some cases, not even after the purchase, which means green goods 
often correspond to credence goods (Karl and Orwat 1999). Therefore, even if consumers 
have green preferences and green goods are being offered in the market, they are not able to 
make informed decisions. Also, firms may opt for less environmentally damaging 
technologies but may find it hard to be rewarded in the market for their CSR. One policy 
option to help market participants overcome this information asymmetry falls within the 
third wave of policy approaches to the externality market failure, namely an information 
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disclosure approach (OECD 2001). One concrete application of this principle is a labelling 
policy, whereby labelling corresponds to “any action by a firm, government, or third party 
that communicates product-specific information to end users” (Roe et al 2014, p. 408). The 
label thus refers to an unobservable characteristic, reducing the information asymmetry 
between the two sides of the market when truthful, as it provides information that the 
consumers would not have been able to acquire otherwise. 
The present paper proposes an experimental design to explore to what extent buyers and 
sellers can voluntary internalize externalities in the market when green goods are possible. 
In the terminology of Bénabou and Tirole (2010), our experiment explores the scope of 
individual and corporate social responsibility to reduce externalities in a market for green 
goods. Specifically, the experimental design mimics a posted-offer competitive green goods 
market, simultaneously addressing two market failures, namely externalities and 
asymmetry of information in credence goods, as well as labels’ capacity to overcome the 
latter consequences in the market.  
Our proposed experimental framework includes the combination of prosocial behavior from 
sellers and buyers, within a competitive market with the possibility of cheating due to 
information asymmetry, as well as the optional inclusion of third party certification (eco-
label), at a cost to firms. Three treatments are designed and implemented. The main 
treatment (TREATMENT CREDENCE) directly matches the market conditions of market for 
green goods, where goods produced with the least expensive technology generate 
externalities on others, whereas green goods do not cause negative impacts. However, the 
claims of “greenness” cannot be verified by buyers.  
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To overcome the information asymmetry, the second treatment includes third party 
certification (TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION) that is a voluntary label. We can 
interpret this as a policy instrument that promotes more transparency in the market place. 
Given that this implies a use of resources in the certification, it is a second-best solution for 
society, but a necessary one. 
The full information treatment (TREATMENT FULL-INFO) is a benchmark treatment. While it 
implements the theoretical first-best solution, it is not realistic in the case of credence 
goods, as opposed to the other two market setups in the two treatments above. However, we 
implement this treatment as it illustrates the limits of the voluntary internalization of 
externalities by market players, albeit in unrealistic conditions.   
Previous laboratory experiments addressed these issues separately and represented markets 
for goods with externalities (e.g. Bartling et al. 2015; Plott 1983), while others treated the 
asymmetry information problem (Bougherara and Piguet 2009; Cason and Gangadharan 
2002; Dejong et al. 1985; Etilé and Teyssier 2016; Miller and Plott 1985). We propose an 
experimental design that simultaneously represents both market failures and that includes 
design features aimed at providing a more realistic laboratorial framework for a green 
goods market. As a consequence, this design becomes more relevant for environmental 
policy purposes, assuring the parallelism condition as advocated by Smith (1982). As the 
main distinctive features of our experiment, we combine both market failures, as well as 
propose an effective implementation of an experimental credence good. Additionally, we 
use homegrown rather than the more commonly used induced values in the asymmetry 
information framework. These options reinforce the realistic framework aimed with our 
experimental design and allow us to establish how far homegrown prosocial preferences 
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can help address externalities in the market. This ultimately addresses the research question 
of whether voluntary approaches through green goods can lead to externality 
internalization.  
The results from the experiment match theoretical expectations, which in turn contribute to 
validate our design as a framework to study externalities mitigation in the market. In 
TREATMENT CREDENCE the results corroborate the theoretical prediction for an inefficient 
market outcome in terms of social welfare. Furthermore, false claims as to the type of good 
are widespread in the market.  
Additionally this experiment provides insights into the market dynamic between buyers and 
sellers and enriches our understanding of the scope of voluntary internalization of 
externalities. A priori we have no expectations as to the extent of prosocial preferences in 
this setup, nor about the outcome of the interaction between buyers and sellers. Other 
economics experiments, which we will explore later, show there is a non-negligible degree 
of prosocial preferences and behaviors, even in the controlled and less morally charged 
environment of an economics lab. While we partly confirm those observations, our 
evidence is less optimistically in support of voluntary approaches. 
When the information asymmetry is solved under full information conditions or when a 
credible label is available, we find a higher share of green goods being traded and a positive 
effect for sellers of establishing a green reputation. However, the market share of actual 
green goods is not as high as other experiments would suggest (e.g. Bartling et al. 2015). 
This result is an indication about the limited power that people’s concern (or not) about 
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consumption consequences on society in general, or on the environment in particular, can 
have to solve an externality problem. 
Within this context our results call for more caution in assessing the potential of voluntary 
approaches to internalize externalities and for a less optimistic view of the power of 
individual and corporate social responsibility. We should not expect the market 
(participants) alone to solve this market failure.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the approaches that 
have been used in the literature to study the above mentioned market failures, involving 
green goods: externalities (in section 2.1) and asymmetric information (in section 2.2), 
focusing on economics experiments that partially share our motivation. In section 3 we 
present our experimental design and procedures, and discuss how our design options differ 
from other experiments in the literature, contributing to a more realistic experimental 
design and ultimately to more externally valid results. Section 4 presents the main results 
across treatments and section 5 discusses the implications. 
 
2 Overview of related economics experiments  
Our experimental framework aims to mimic a market for green goods, simultaneously 
addressing two market failures, externalities and asymmetry of information. It also 
evaluates the ability of green goods market to internalize the negative externalities when 
the information asymmetry is withdrawn, namely by using a credible third party 
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certification. Different economics experiments partially address these issues and we review 
these contributions. Section 2.1 explores how previous experiments have addressed green 
and ethical goods and the considerations of externalities by market participants. Section 2.2 
focuses on the information asymmetry problem implied by green credence goods.   
 
2.1. Green goods and externalities  
For there to be a market for green goods, with consumers demanding them and suppliers 
willing to offer them, either one of these market parts, or both, need to care about the 
externalities generated by the consumption of conventional “brown”1 alternatives. We can 
thus assume that the demand for green goods stems from a consideration of prosocial 
motivations in consumption or production. In the terminology of Bénabou and Tirole 
(2010), there needs to be individual and corporate social responsibility in the marketplace.  
Following the framework of Lancaster (1966)’s characteristics theory of value, green 
goods, or ethical goods in general, combine a private with a public good attribute (Cornes 
and Sandler 1994; Kotchen 2006). For there to be demand for these goods, consumers need 
to care for the public good attribute to value it when choosing amongst market alternatives. 
In economics experiments, homegrown values may be used to studying green or ethical 
goods, by introducing a charitable cause or a third party in the design as the public good 
attribute. Using this kind of framework makes it unnecessary to induce higher preferences 
                                                   
1
 For simplicity in terms of exposition, we will use the term “green” good to mean a good that causes no 
externalities as opposed to a “brown” good that causes externalities. Reality is obviously more nuanced. 
Furthermore,  the terms “green” and “brown” refer to environmental externalities, but both the experimental 
framework and analysis can be extended to more generically named “ethical” goods whereby the public good 
attribute is a broader social dimension. 
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for the higher quality good (the green good) since consumers will prefer it as long as they 
have prosocial preferences and producers decide to offer it in the market. When a specific 
type of good is sold, a third party is impacted positively (as in the case of a charitable cause 
that receives a certain donation) or negatively (as in the case of a negative externality on a 
third party) and consumers may or may not consider this in their utility maximization 
decisions. Rode et al. (2008), Valente (2015) and Bartling et al. (2015), for example, have 
taken this approach to social preferences in their experimental studies to study markets for 
green and ethical goods. 
Both Rode et al. (2008) and Valente (2015) use a charitable donation in their experiments 
as a differentiating feature of the goods. Valente (2015) extends the analysis in Rode et al. 
(2008) to a simpler market setting but allowing the market interaction between buyers and 
sellers to endogenously determine the ethical dimension of the goods sold rather than 
exogenously defining how much the ethical cost is and who can sell those goods. The 
results in Valente (2015) show that ethical differentiation is valued by consumers and that 
sellers are able to charge higher prices successfully, adding arguments towards the 
existence of a market for ethical / green goods. 
A different experimental approach to consider the specific case for a public bad is used by 
Bartling et al. (2017; 2015). In this case, an explicit externality for a “passive” third party is 
experimentally represented, consisting of another experimental subject unrelated to the 
market interactions. Aiming to study whether individual and corporate social responsibility 
is sustained within a market context, Bartling et al. (2015) design a market experiment 
involving the sale of two type of goods: the “unfair product”, which generates externalities 
and is cheaper to produce, and the “fair good” that does not generate externalities but costs 
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more to produce. These authors study had a similar goal as our own although their 
experimental design differed in several aspects. Bartling et al. (2015) implement an 
experimental posted-offer market with excess supply, which means one seller per period 
does not sell an item, and where each third party is randomly matched with one of the units 
sold. We did not include these features, as detailed in section 3. Buyers’ private value from 
the consumption of both fair and unfair goods is the same in Bartling et al. (2015), as well 
as in our experiment.  
Plott (1983) introduces externalities in an experimental market lab. These are represented 
as a negative impact on the other subjects in the market when a brown good is purchased, a 
procedure we also adopt. However, differently from all the other studies just mentioned, it 
uses induced instead of homegrown values, where goods differing in their quality translate 
into different utility levels for consumers. That is to say consumers prefer the higher or 
better quality goods because their consumption yields more utility through the channel of 
monetary payoffs. From a social point of view, the higher quality good generates higher 
welfare gain than the purchase of a lower quality good, considering how monetary payoffs 
are parametrised. This option associates a higher quality as well as higher utility levels to 
the consumption of a green good than to the more conventional brown ones, which in 
reality is not usually the case. Therefore, in order to achieve the intended parallelism 
between our experimental study and the real market for green goods, we resort to 
homegrown values in our experiment.  
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2.2. Green goods as credence goods: the information asymmetry 
problem  
Imperfect information about quality of goods and asymmetric information between 
producers and consumers imply market outcomes different from predicted for classic 
models of perfect competition. In some cases, consumers can learn eventually about true 
quality of the products through experience, or search (Nelson 1970). However, for credence 
goods, the solution is not as straightforward, because firms do not have the proper 
incentives to provide truthful information to consumers who are unable to verify the real 
good quality even after experience, as noted by Darby and Karni (1973). In terms of 
credence goods, two definitions are possible following Dulleck et al. (2011). One strand of 
literature follows from Darby and Karni (1973)’s definition of goods and services that 
consumers need but whose quality they cannot judge, as is the case with specialist services 
such as healthcare or mechanical repairs (e.g. Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). We focus 
instead on credence goods as goods that “have qualities which are expensive to judge even 
after purchase [… and] typical examples mentioned in this second strand of literature are 
goods vertically differentiated by process attributes (…) and typical assumption made is 
that consumers know what they want or need, but observe neither what they get nor the 
utility derived from what they get” (Dulleck et al. 2011, p. 527).  
Credence goods may suffer from sellers’ fraud considering the true quality of the good 
being sold, with cheap talk announcements in the market and, consequently, a predicted 
market equilibrium with only bad quality goods traded, i.e., Akerlof (1970)’s prediction of 
a “market for lemons”. To overcome this problem, third-party certification and a credible 
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label policy is needed. Several authors have approached this issue from a theoretical 
perspective (e.g., Amacher et al. 2004; Baksi and Bose 2007; Baksi et al. 2016; Bonroy and 
Constantatos 2008; Cohen and Vandenbergh 2012; Dosi and Moretto 2001; Hamilton and 
Zilberman 2006; Karl and Orwat 1999; Krarup and Russell 2005; Mason 2006; Mason 
2011; Roe and Sheldon 2007; Roe et al. 2014). 
The experimental framework most commonly used to study information asymmetries 
considers an induced preferences approach (Dejong et al. 1985; Holt and Sherman 1990; 
Lynch et al. 1991; Miller and Plott 1985). Experimental studies referring specifically to 
green goods markets and eco-labelling have also been using the induced preferences 
approach to model the environmental attribute as credence or experience attribute. 
Consumers thus have an incentive to look for information to distinguish between the goods 
and this information can either be given by the seller, either in what is often referred to as a 
cheap talk label (since sellers can simply lie about the quality of the good) or in a certified 
manner. Cason and Gangadharan (2002), one of the most cited experimental studies 
motivated by green goods and labelling of environmental quality, also uses the induced 
preferences approach - an abstract setting with “supers” and “regulars”, which give 
different levels of utility, and have different costs on the production side. These authors 
conclude that allowing for reputations, further including cheap talk, and even further 
introducing certification increases the share of supers supplied relative to the baseline. 
However, Cason and Gangadharan (2002) experimental design does not include spillovers 
from one consumer’s choice to the other (therefore the individual choice problem coincides 
with the social problem) neither externalities are considered (whereby the choice of one 
consumer benefits or harms other consumers). Therefore, although green goods motivate 
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this study (goods that cause less or no harm to the environment, in comparison to the brown 
goods), the authors do not include in their experiment the external costs they impose, as it 
was the case of the experiments mentioned on the previous section. Additionally, 
experience, not credence, goods are represented by Cason and Gangadharan (2002), as their 
experiment included end-of-round revelation, i.e., the type of good offered by all sellers 
was revealed at the end of each period. Bougherara and Piguet (2009) build on Cason and 
Gangadharan (2002) but include an outside option for buyers and variations of the labelling 
and certification schemes, using an experimental setting under conditions closer to the 
credence good nature. However, Bougherara and Piguet (2009) do not fully accomplish the 
objective of experimentally representing a market for credence goods as some end of period 
revelation still existed during the experimental sessions (although only after some periods). 
Previous experimental studies did not simultaneously include the externalities and 
information asymmetry problems for the provision of green goods, i.e. the public good and 
the credence good characteristics. One notable exception in the experimental literature that 
addresses externalities and asymmetric information under homegrown preferences is Etilé 
and Teyssier (2016). The authors use a market where sellers can choose how much to give 
a charity out of the price (a positive externality) but also consider the possibility for 
asymmetric information. They design a baseline with credence good since donations 
associated with the units traded were not observed by participants. Additionally, these 
authors consider the impact of using a label in another treatment, whereby the label informs 
that at least a certain amount is (in fact) donated to charity. Etilé and Teyssier (2016) 
experimental design includes another treatment with a cheap talk label that can be used by 
sellers, even if a donation of at least a certain amount is not made, but with a positive 
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probability of being caught lying. As sellers can be identified, these authors also test a 
reputation effect. Etilé and Teyssier (2016) conclude efficiency gains in this market can be 
achieved through the introduction of a reliable label (third party certification), whereas 
when reputation it is not important, unsubstantiated claims produce a halo effect on 
consumers behavior. 
 
3 Experimental framework and procedures 
We study a market where two types of goods are available, namely brown goods generating 
an externality on others and green credence goods. The experimental design features and 
parameters are detailed in section 3.1. Section 3.2 describes the procedures adopted for the 
implementation of the experiment and section 3.3. briefly relates our design features to the 
literature.  
 
3.1. Experimental design and parameters 
We design a posted-offer market, with three buyers and three sellers, where two types of 
goods are available, a green and a brown good, which differ in their production costs and 
whether externalities are generated. In terms of the instructions, the framing is neutral and 
goods are referred to as simply A and B, green and brown good respectively. The 
difference between the two goods is presented in terms of differences in production costs 
and the imposition (or not) of external costs on others. 
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The production cost of a green good is of 50 (experimental points) whereas the brown good 
is 40, but if the firm does not sell it does not incur the production cost. Sellers have no 
supply restrictions, which imply that they can offer all the units being demanded in the 
market, although they can only produce one type of good (A or B) in each period. Buyers, 
on the other hand, buy at most one unit per period and receive the same payoff (100) for 
either a green or brown good, that is if a unit is purchased the buyer receives 100 points 
(minus the price paid), regardless of the type of good. Although not rational, buyers are 
allowed to accept a price for the goods that implies a loss (as the price set can be up to 110 
points). They can choose from which producer to purchase their good and are aware that 
whenever a unit of a brown good is purchased a negative externality of 20 is caused, 
implying a 10 points loss on each of the other two buyers in the market.  
At the beginning of the experiment, firms are given 400 experimental points, whereas 
buyers are given 20 experimental points in each round. While this is equivalent in terms of 
payoffs, we wanted buyers to be assured an income in each round even if they chose not to 
make a purchase (i.e., this is similar to an outside option). Parameters corresponding to the 
green and brown goods are summarized in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
Our experimental setting represents a market for a credence good with negative 
externalities (TREATMENT CREDENCE). In this treatment firms have an incentive to provide 
misleading information to consumers (announcing a green good although effectively 
producing a brown good) because they know consumers are not able to distinguish the 
quality of the goods. This cheap-talk from sellers is only applicable for the green good, as 
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when announcing the brown good sellers have no incentive to produce a green good but the 
opposite is true. Therefore, when deciding to buy a brown good, buyers know they are 
imposing the externality on others, whereas when a green good is purchased the buyer is 
not sure if she is imposing this cost and the other two buyers do not know for sure if they 
will bear an externality cost. This information is revealed only at the end of the session, in 
the summary payoff screen. TREATMENT CREDENCE additionally allows for consumers’ 
prosocial behavior and sellers’ corporate social responsibility, in spite of the information 
asymmetry, as consumers can still choose to buy green and sellers can choose to actually 
produce green. On the contrary, this treatment also opens the possibility of “greenwashing”, 
whereby false claims are made as to the true nature of goods, and consumers are misled (or 
allow themselves to be misled) into choosing these goods. However, in theory no green 
goods should be produced as these are more expensive to produce and buyers should not 
demand them given that their true quality is not verifiable. 
An additional treatment explores the impact of using an optional seller label (the so-called 
eco-label in the case of green goods) to overcome the informational market failure 
(TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION). This treatment is similar to TREATMENT 
CREDENCE except for the inclusion of the possibility of firms to pay a fixed cost of 2 points 
(regardless of selling or not, and per round) for a certification label for a green good. In this 
case, firms can announce green goods, brown goods and certified green goods. Participants 
know for sure the externalities imposed on each round when buying brown good or 
certified green goods but not in the case of a green good. Similarly to TREATMENT 
CREDENCE there is no type revelation in each round, and only at the end of the 20 periods 
are all payoffs computed and displayed.  
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Finally, in TREATMENT FULL-INFO the type of good proposed by sellers is truthfully 
revealed, so actual externalities imposed on others (if any) are also known with certainty at 
the end of each period (round) in the market. Therefore, this treatment allows us to evaluate 
whether or not there are social preferences in this context and serves as a benchmark for the 
results in the two main treatments. 
Table 2 summarizes the main features and differences of the three treatments implemented. 
[Table 2 here] 
All treatments represent a market with twenty rounds including the three sequential stages 
described in Table 3.  The appendix includes two screenshots from the Z-tree (Fischbacher 
2007) interface for TREATMENT CREDENCE as an illustration. The instructions are included 
in the appendix for refereeing purposes. 
[Table 3 here] 
At the end of the twenty rounds actual payoffs, including externalities, are calculated and 
revealed to all participants - a summary display, consisting of the earnings from the twenty 
rounds, rather than per period information. Earnings from all the twenty rounds are 
converted at a conversion rate of 100 experimental points = £1.75, and privately 
announced. 
 
3.2. Experimental procedures 
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This experiment was run in February 2015 at the Experimental Economics Laboratory of 
Royal Holloway, University of London (UK) using Z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). As per 
Table 4, 120 subjects took part and each subject participated in one treatment only in a 
fixed group and fixed role.  
[Table 4 here] 
Each experimental session started with a private reading of the instructions by all 
participants for both roles, an oral summary of the instructions and some practice questions 
to verify if all instructions were understood. Only after the actual experiment began, were 
participants informed of the role they would play for twenty rounds.  Groups of three sellers 
and three buyers were randomly matched in each session and interacted in fixed groups and 
roles for twenty rounds per session. 
At the end of the twenty-round market experiment, there was a short questionnaire 
concerning the participant and the experiment, which also allowed subjects to make any 
kind of comments about the session. Sessions lasted approximately one hour and thirty 
minutes and subjects earned on average £14.24, which were paid immediately at the end of 
the session. 
 
3.3. Design features in relation to the literature   
In this subsection we briefly highlight the main design features and how they differ from 
other economics experiments.  
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The first noteworthy design feature concerns how we implement externalities. We 
implement negative externalities as the impact on the other subjects that are part of the 
market, and whose payoff is affected by the choices of the other consumers. Etilé and 
Teyssier (2016), on the other hand, do not consider its impact on any agent involved in the 
experiment but only on the amount of donations NGOs would get from their decisions. We 
attempt to mimic a situation where a buyer’s purchase decision impacts those in a similar 
situation, which means “browner” choices harm other individuals not far removed (as 
would be the case of a consumer in a developed country making choices that affect those in 
poorer countries), but close to her. This procedure also differs from that of Bartling et al. 
(2015) that implement externalities as the impact on a third party unrelated with the market 
setting (i.e., an experimental subject that does not participate in the market as buyer or 
seller). However, our choice is similar to the one adopted by Plott (1983) where each 
subject is hurt when others buy the goods and cause harm on others whenever engaged on 
trade (in our experiment, whenever a brown good is traded).  
The second feature concerns the information asymmetry. The main experimental treatments 
we implement (CREDENCE and THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION) mimic a market for credence 
goods with externalities in the sense that buyers cannot be sure whether they are in fact 
buying green or not, unless the good is certified in the latter treatment. In practice, in terms 
of design protocol, at the end of each period earnings are calculated for every buyer and 
seller, and externalities from announced brown goods computed. However, in the case of 
green goods, given their credence attribute, buyers are not sure of what they purchased, so 
potential externalities are not computed. Participants are reminded that a purchase of an 
announced green good may in fact be brown and only at the end of the experiment, total 
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externalities generated and suffered are computed. In this sense, our design differs from 
Plott (1983) and Bartling et al. (2015) that implement externalities but not the credence 
attribute, and Cason and Gangadharan (2002) who use experience goods (as there is end-of-
round revelation) not credence. Our design also differs from Bougherara and Piguet (2009), 
that build upon the Cason and Gangadharan (2002) protocol, and try to implement credence 
goods, but continue to use end-of-round revelation, although only after some periods. 
Third, we opt for homegrown rather than induced preferences. The same value is given in 
our experiment to green and brown goods as we opted to let the distinction between them 
be via the individual’s utility function, that is whether the externality on others impacts the 
individual’s utility. Like Rode et al. (2008), Valente (2015), Bartling et al. (2017; 2015) 
and Etilé and Teyssier (2016) we study goods that differ in their external impact and will 
thus be likely to be valued differently by different individuals rather than impose that their 
objective experimental value is different. This option distinguishes our work from that of 
Plott (1983), Cason and Gangadharan (2002) and Bougherara and Piguet (2009), for 
instance, as they opt for an induced preferences approach.   
Fourth, we represent a competitive market, where sellers are free to propose goods that 
differ in their type and price, and able to offer all units demanded in the market, and buyers 
are not forced to accept a less valued good or a less attractive offer simply because there are 
not enough goods available for all buyers. On the contrary, Cason and Gangadharan (2002) 
restrict the number of items that can be sold, which implies in any given rounds there may 
not be goods available for certain buyers by the time they enter the market. Etilé and 
Teyssier (2016), on the other hand, opt to have a market where supply is able to meet all 
demand, but on the demand side impose that buyers buy a minimum amount each period 
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rather than allow them not to make a purchase, as we did by giving them a fixed 
endowment each period, even if not buying any good. 
 
4 Results 
In this section we present the results across the three treatments with particular emphasis on 
TREATMENT CREDENCE. We explore how introducing the possibility of reducing the 
information asymmetry, or removing it, impacts market outcomes, respectively in 
TREATMENTS THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION and FULL-INFO.  
First, we explore market outcomes in terms of the share of green and brown goods and 
calculate social welfare for each treatment. Then we focus on market outcomes but as 
perceived by market participants given that production decisions may not correspond to 
announcement decisions. Therefore, false claims and greenwashing in TREATMENT 
CREDENCE are explored. Then, in section 4.2. and 4.3. we focus on the supply and demand 
side of the market respectively. Finally, we discuss the main results for each treatment and 
how they allow us to understand the potential role of the market for green goods to help 
internalize externalities.  
 
4.1. Overview of results across treatments 
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Table 5 presents a summary of the share of green goods in each treatment. In terms of 
social welfare, only goods that were produced with green technologies are relevant, so we 
start by presenting an overview of actual green goods proposed and purchased, that is of 
actual market outcomes. Later in section 4.1.2. we explore how actual green goods diverge 
from claims of greenness to show that each market looks in fact different from the 
perspective of consumers. For the following analysis we will pool market/ period 
observations.  
[Table 5 here] 
4.1.1.  Actual market outcomes 
The shares of actual green goods proposed and traded are in   
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Table 5. TREATMENT CREDENCE includes two sessions with three markets each, thus six 
groups of three buyers and sellers. The proposals are for the twenty rounds for a total of 
360 units that can be purchased. We observe that 15.6% (56) of producer proposals are for 
actual green goods. 
Similarly to the TREATMENT CREDENCE, in TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION there 
are six groups resulting in 360 proposals and potential units sold. There are 106 green 
goods proposed out of the 360 potential, corresponding to a 29.4%. A first comparison of 
these results shows that producers seem more willing to propose the production of green 
goods than in TREATMENT CREDENCE – as expected. When comparing announcements for 
green goods in TREATMENT CREDENCE and TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION we 
find statistically significant differences following a non-parametric rank-sum test 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = -3.12, p<0.01). 
In TREATMENT FULL-INFO, of the 480 producer proposals, 31.9% are for greens goods 
while the remainder are for brown goods.  In terms of announcements of actual green goods 
in TREATMENT FULL-INFO and TREATMENT CREDENCE, we find statistically significant 
differences following a non-parametric rank-sum test that compares the announcements in 
each market per period (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = 4.65, p<0.01). As for the 
comparison of TREATMENT FULL-INFO with TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION, 
there are no statistically significant differences (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = -1.06, 
p=0.29). 
We now explore market outcomes, i.e. the share of actual green goods purchased in each 
treatment. This is illustrated in Figure 1a over the 20 periods and in Figure 1b with 
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averages calculated over four periods to smooth variations. Both in TREATMENT CREDENCE 
and TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION there is a decreasing share of green goods. 
Only TREATMENT FULL-INFO shows relatively high green good market shares. 
Figure 1 Share of actual green purchases 
  
In all three treatments the share of actual green goods is not high (compared to other 
expressions of prosocial behavior in the experimental literature). In TREATMENT FULL-INFO 
in terms of demand behavior, we observe that 87 of the potential 480 units sold are of green 
goods (18.1%). In TREATMENT CREDENCE, only 10.3% of units were actually green. When 
comparing number of green goods sold in each market in TREATMENTS FULL-INFO and 
CREDENCE over the 20 periods, we find statistically significant differences following a non-
parametric rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = 1.81, p<0.10). Also the overall 
share of actual greens is significantly different across both treatments following a Fisher 
independence test (Fisher exact test 2-tailed p-value < 0.01). 
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In the TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION, the overall share of green is 25.8%. As 
for the comparison of number of greens in each market and period, there are statistically 
significant differences between TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION and CREDENCE 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = 2.87, p<0.10) but no differences in comparison with 
FULL-INFO (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = 1.27, p=0.21). 
To evaluate the different market outcomes observed depending on treatment, for each 
treatment the theoretical net social benefit is calculated taking into consideration the 
experimental setup in Table 3 and the parameters in Table 1. Then, we take the actual 
number of green and brown goods purchased in each treatment and calculate the net social 
benefit observed tocompare it with the social optimum case (all greens). The results are in 
Table 6. 
[Table 6 here] 
In TREATMENT CREDENCE the actual social benefit is 81.2% of the social optimum (i.e., the 
net social benefit benchmark of all greens). Fully removing the information asymmetry 
yields social benefit equivalent to 83.1% of social optimum (in TREATMENT FULL-INFO) 
and a partial information scenario results in 84% of social optimum (in TREATMENT THIRD 
PARTY CERTIFICATION). As such social welfare maximization is not achieved in the 
presence of negative externalities and credence goods. While the result in TREATMENT 
CREDENCE is not surprising, neither the possibility of reducing the information asymmetry 
via a label nor full information substantially increases observed net social benefit. The 
remaining inefficiency can be attributed to how individuals value the negative externality, 
which does not appear to be enough to counter its impact.  
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4.1.2.  Market outcomes as perceived by market participants 
Given the information asymmetry as to the type of good in TREATMENT CREDENCE and 
THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION, unless the green good is certified buyers and the other sellers 
are not sure if the good was produced with green technology. Therefore what they observe 
can differ from what is actually produced. A striking result in   
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Table 5 is that market participants throughout the experiment observe roughly 70% to 77% 
of good proposals to be green. Also, in terms of goods purchased, the shares are 63.6% and 
76.2%. To the uniformed observer, these markets are highly pro-environmental.  
In TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION, a few non-certified green goods are indeed 
green (  
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Table 5). Also in TREATMENT CREDENCE, in spite of the information asymmetry 10.3% of 
all traded goods were produced with green technology. Within the setup of this experiment 
these two cases can be interpreted as examples of corporate social responsibility in that 
sellers incur higher production costs, even though the market cannot verify it. 
We focus more closely in TREATMENT CREDENCE in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Given the 
information asymmetry, in theory no green goods should be offered or purchased. However 
as Figure 2 illustrates, out of the 18 units announced and potentially traded each round, a 
significant share is for actual green goods. In terms of claimed quality of the goods in the 
market, “greens” represent 77.8% of the market announcements in period 1 and 66.7% in 
period 20 (average of 69.4% over the 20 periods). However, only 44.4% of initial 
announcements are for actual green goods in period 1 and in the last period no good 
proposed is in fact green (average actual green share of 15.6% over the 20 periods). 
Therefore, while the market supply appears to be green (the corresponding share is in 
dashed green in Figure 3a), it is in fact falsely announced as green (the actual green share is 
in solid green in Figure 3b), which is a tactic that is often referred to as greenwashing. 
Figure 2 Announcements and purchases of green and brown goods in TREATMENT 
CREDENCE  
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Figure 3 Announcements of green and brown goods in TREATMENT CREDENCE 
 
As consequence of the false claims made by sellers protected by the information 
asymmetry, many consumers choose to buy a green good (as in Figure 4a), which in reality 
turns out to be majorly brown (Figure 4b). The contrast between how consumers perceive 
the market in Figure 4a and the actual reality in Figure 4b attests to the existence of 
greenwashing in this market as while we know that the green share in this market is small, 
for consumers this market appears supportive of green goods.  
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Figure 4 Purchases: share of green and brown goods in TREATMENT CREDENCE 
 
4.2. Behavior on the supply side and reputation effects  
In all three treatments, subjects are paired into fixed groups, so in each market buyers can 
follow the behavior of each of the sellers throughout the 20 periods. It is thus possible for 
reputation effects to emerge. To capture reputation, specifically green reputation of sellers, 
we compute for each period the running sum up to that period (inclusive) of the times a 
seller proposed a green good in the market (green reputation). In TREATMENT FULL-INFO 
this corresponds to goods that were produced with green technology as well, whereas in the 
other treatments these are goods announced as green. This is in fact how the goods in the 
market are perceived by buyers and sellers. Then to account for the relative green 
reputation of a seller, we calculate how this value relates to the reputation of the greenest 
competitor in terms of proposals (relative green reputation). A positive relative green 
reputation implies the seller has proposed to produce green goods more often than 
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competitors. On the contrary, a negative relative green reputation implies that at least one 
other seller in the market has a greener reputation. 
Table 7 presents the results from a panel data Logit model that regresses the probability of 
selling in a particular period on this relative reputation measure. In both cases, we control 
for the proposed price, how the proposed price compares relative to the lowest price in the 
market (lowest competitors’ price), whether the proposed good is green (green good 
proposed) and whether at least one competitor is proposing a green good (other green 
goods proposed). In TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION we include a binary variable 
for whether the seller opted for certification (certification). 
[Table 7 here] 
In regressions (1) – (4) the probability of selling in a given period depends, as expected, 
negatively on the price proposed and positively on the competitors’ price. All else being 
equal, proposing a green good increases the probability of selling in TREATMENT CREDENCE 
and TREATMENT FULL-INFO. While the coefficient of this variable is not statistically 
significant in TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION, whether the seller chooses to 
certify its proposed green good increases the probability of selling (model 3). Therefore in a 
context where certification is possible, simply offering a green good is not sufficient to sell. 
Specifically in the case of TREATMENT CREDENCE, the coefficient of the binary variable 
corresponding to at least a competitor proposing a green good, decreases the likelihood of 
selling, but has no statistically significant impact on other treatments.  
How a seller fares relative to competitors in terms of green reputation has a positive impact 
in TREATMENT FULL-INFO and TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION. Having proposed 
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more green goods than competitors up to a particular period increases the probability of 
selling in that period. However, given the information asymmetry in TREATMENT 
CREDENCE, this reputational measure has no impact on buyers’ choices, as expected.  
 
4.3. Behavior on the demand side and prices paid for green goods 
It is also relevant to analyze buyers’ behavior in terms of how they value a good’s 
greenness. We present in Table 8 a random effects panel regression of the price paid by 
each buyer as a function of the type of good (variable green good purchased from the 
perspective of buyers) and in TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION a dummy variable 
captures whether the purchased good is certified (green good certified). Additionally we 
include a linear time variable.  
[Table 8 here] 
In all three treatments, there is a statistically significant and positive coefficient on the 
dummy that indicates if the good purchased is green. Green goods are thus more highly 
priced relative to brown goods. Additionally there is a price premium for being certified 
green in TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION. Concerning the period variable, there is 
a significant decrease trend in the price paid in models (1) and (3). This is consistent with 
the results in Bartling et al. (2015) for example. 
In all treatments green goods accrue a price premium relative to brown goods. This is 
corroborated when comparing prices. Goods that are announced as green have an average 
price of 51 experimental points and brown goods of 46.2 in TREATMENT CREDENCE. There 
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are statistically significant differences between the prices of green goods and brown goods 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = 6.15, p<0.01). On the contrary, in TREATMENT THIRD 
PARTY CERTIFICATION the differences are not significant (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = 
0.53, p=0.600). However when certified green goods are compared to the other goods in the 
market, the prices are higher (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = 9.43, p<0.01), which 
indicates that the market attributes a price premium to certification. 
Furthermore, we can compare prices for green goods across treatments. When comparing 
green good prices in TREATMENT CREDENCE with each of the other treatment, there is 
evidence that those are lower namely comparing with certified green goods in TREATMENT 
THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = -7.44, p<0.01) and 
comparing with green goods in TREATMENT FULL-INFO (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test z = -
3.62, p<0.01). So a consequence of the information asymmetry in TREATMENT CREDENCE 
is that green goods accrue a lower price in the market than when the asymmetry can be 
partially removed (or is removed all together). This is consistent with the fact that buyers 
cannot be sure of the true quality of the good and thus prices cannot reflect the good’s true 
quality. 
 
4.4. Discussion of results  
Several of the results from this experiment conform to theoretical expectations. However 
there are surprising results that expand our knowledge as to the degree to which green 
preferences and goods can help mitigate externalities.  
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In TREATMENT CREDENCE given the information asymmetry, false claims about the 
greenness of goods are abundant, when in fact actual green goods produced are few. In 
terms of the perception of market greenness, in each round, markets appears quite 
environmentally concerned. This observation attests to the pervasiveness of greenwashing 
taking place on the part of sellers, and to buyers allowing themselves to be deceived. In 
fact, even in this setup, proposing a “green” good increases the probability of selling in a 
given period. An additional result is that prices for green goods are lower in this treatment, 
so the pervasiveness of green choices may be explained by the lower prices.  
Furthermore, while that low share of actual green goods is not surprising, the fact that it is 
non-zero is. Given that buyers cannot ascertain the true type of the good, the fact that some 
goods are actually produced with green technology is counterintuitive. This corresponds to 
CSR given that producer could have simply lied about the true quality. As consequence, in 
spite of the information asymmetry some sellers opt for more expensive technologies that 
do not impose externalities.  
These are good news both from the supply and from the demand side of the market for the 
potential of voluntary approaches to help solve an externality problem. Therefore voluntary 
approaches can be a part of the solution to solving externalities. 
On the contrary, the results from the other treatments limit that potential. With no 
information asymmetry, or with the option to remove it, we observe a share of green goods 
produced of just around 1/5 to 1/4 of the market. In TREATMENT THIRD PARTY 
CERTIFICATION there is also the appearance of pervasive green behavior. Statistically, prices 
of green and brown goods do not differ, however certified green goods do accrue a price 
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premium. Therefore, the introduction of an optional eco-label partially helps market 
participants internalize externalities. However, false green claims and purchases are still 
abundant. This is not surprising given that prices of certified goods are higher. 
Finally, TREATMENT FULL-INFO serves as a benchmark as it presents the unrealistic first-
best solution. With no information asymmetry, no false claims can be made and buyers 
need not be wary of uncertified green goods or discount them in the market. The results 
from this treatment thus provide a reference in terms of the potential of the voluntary 
internalization of externalities. Given the share of 18.1% of green purchases overall, we can 
conclude that there appears to be a limit to how far green preferences and CSR can solve 
the externality market failure.  
 
5 Conclusions 
Green and ethical goods are now available in consumer markets as alternatives to more 
conventional goods and offer a pro-socially motivated consumer the option to care for a 
public good cause through her consumption decisions. However without an eco-label it is 
not possible for the consumer to check both before and after the purchase if the claims 
really are legitimate and the purchased item is not causing externalities on the environment. 
In economics these types of goods are said to have a credence attribute. The current paper, 
using an experimental approach, explores precisely this credence attribute in a context 
where consumers are given the possibility to care about the externalities caused by their 
purchase decisions and sellers can produce goods that do not cause externalities. 
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Theoretically, both features individually imply that social welfare maximization should not 
be achieved and this is in fact observed in the experiment reported here.  
We study a market where brown goods cause an externality on others and where green 
goods have a credence attribute, and allow for individuals to choose according to their 
preferences, rather than induce preferences. Also, we do not restrict supply as has been 
done in similarly motivated experiments. As a consequence all buyers in the market are 
able to buy from just one firm, and are not forced or restricted to buy from the remaining 
offers available. 
Our main research question concerns the simultaneous impact of the information 
asymmetry (credence feature) and the existence of externalities on others when a brown 
good is consumed. Furthermore, while information asymmetries may prevent the social 
optimum from being achieved, consumers need to care about the external costs of their 
actions on others. A standard economic assumption is for consumers or firms not to 
voluntarily internalize externalities. A seller label or a full information setting may help 
overcome the inefficiencies in TREATMENT CREDENCE, but only as long as market 
participants value not causing externalities on others.  
As expected theoretically we observe that in TREATMENT CREDENCE the share of actual 
greens sold is the lowest of all three treatments. There is a marginal improvement in the 
market outcomes of the other two treatments (TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION 
and TREATMENT FULL-INFO) relative to TREATMENT CREDENCE. Social welfare 
maximization is however not achieved, as it would imply that all market participants value 
the burden placed on others from their consumption choices. Indeed the green market share 
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is only roughly 1/5 to 1/4 in this experiment when the information asymmetry is partially or 
totally removed.  
Therefore theoretical predictions are verified and we observe the expected results. However 
we find a level of actual green consumption below that of other experiments (e.g., Bartling 
et al. 2015 report 44% of market share for the good that does not impose externalities) and 
believe this is driven by non-trivial design options, but which are aligned with more 
realistic market conditions. As we mentioned, we choose features that closely resemble the 
type of good that motivated our experiments. As such, our protocol in the main treatment 
mimics credence goods by not revealing information about the actual externalities caused, 
until the end of the experiment when payments need to be disclosed. Also, as in Plott 
(1983) we implement externalities of consumption as the impact on other buyers, namely 
similar participants who are asked to make similar decisions within the same group, which 
means the decisions are reciprocal. Finally, we do not introduce supply restrictions which 
could have led to “forced” green consumption or at least not being free to buy the preferred 
choice. All of these features combined may have reduced prosocial behavior throughout the 
experiment in comparison to other experiments in the literature, but we believe that has in 
turn made both our design and our results more realistic.  
Moreover, the reduced market share for green goods observed within our experimental 
setting is in line with studies on consumers’ attitude-behavior gap (e.g. Boulstridge and 
Carrigan 2000; Devinney et al. 2010). In fact, in spite of widespread support in surveys for 
pro-environmental consumption choices, actual purchases make green goods still part of a 
niche market. These results conform with a recent EU survey whereby 26% of respondents 
indicated that they bought green goods (European Commission 2013), even though support 
38 
 
for green goods is much higher (89% agree that “buying environmentally-friendly products 
can make a difference to the environment”, p. 6). 
In the broader study of sustainable development, sustainable consumption and individual 
choices can play a major role (EU Commission 2014; OECD 2001, 2002). It is often argued 
that information provision as to the environmental attributes of goods can foster sustainable 
consumption, notably “consumers should be empowered to make informed choices through 
better information on green credentials of different products” (EU Commission 2014, p.7). 
Our experimental results do not challenge this approach but caution as to the limits of 
voluntary individual and corporate social responsibility. Also, given the results concerning 
greenwashing and false claims as to the greenness of goods, we can go as far as saying that 
from a societal perspective it is worth for green claims made in the market to be frequently 
audited or else we all run the risk of assuming the market is addressing externalities, when 
in fact it is not. 
Plott (1983) challenges the belief that given that individuals exhibit some forms of 
prosocial behavior, markets will not ignore externalities, or alternatively “people are aware, 
sensitive, and concerned about others so why should they behave in such an atomistic 
fashion?” (p. 106). Furthering this conclusion, our experimental results show that voluntary 
measures relying on consumer choices and potentially concern for others, even if supported 
by eco-label solutions, are not enough to provide a social optimum equilibrium. The market 
share for the green goods still remains residual, even when the asymmetric information 
market failure is solved with reliable certification. This suggests that more conventional 
policy approaches are needed to address the externality problem.  
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In conclusion, in this paper we propose a novel and more realistic experimental design to 
studying green goods market and assess to what extent individual and corporate social 
responsibility can voluntarily address the externality market failure. The results point to the 
limited role that this type of voluntary approaches can play in tackling externalities. A 
natural extension of this experimental setup would be to test different policy instruments to 
address the externality problem. 
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Table 1 Parameters for the green and brown goods (in experimental units) 
  green brown 
(-) production cost 50 40 
(-) externalities 0 20 
(+) benefit 100 100 
(=) net social benefit 50 40 
(-) certification cost (if 
applicable) 2   
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Table 2 Treatment features 
 
Legend: “-“ not applicable; “” present; “?” uncertain from the buyer’s perspective 
  
CREDENCE THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION FULL-INFO 
Truthful announcements
brown good   
green good 
certified green good 
Certification 
Externalities known with certainty
brown good   
green good ? ? 
certified green good -  -
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Table 3 Stages within each round 
Stage 1: Firms’ proposals 
All treatments: firms choose to produce green or brown goods and set a price for the good. 
Additionally for TREATMENT CREDENCE and TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION: firms 
decide the type of good to be announced (which may differ from the one 
being produced).  
Additionally for TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION: when choosing to produce a green 
good, firms are asked if they wish to pay for a certification of the good.  
Stage 2:  Market proposals and buyer decision 
All treatments: proposals of each seller concerning the price and (announced) type of good 
are revealed. Each buyer can choose from whom to purchase one unit or 
whether not to make a purchase. 
Stage 3:  Information about market outcomes 
All treatments: participants are informed about the choices and all transactions made in the 
market. At this stage no decision has to be made. 
 Producers learn about the price, announced type of good and sales of the 
other firms, as well as their own. Period and cumulative earnings are 
calculated and revealed to sellers. 
 Buyers learn about the price, announced type of good and sales of each 
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producer. Period and cumulative earnings, as well as externalities, are 
calculated and revealed to buyers as far as is possible in each period. 
TREATMENT FULL-INFO: all relevant information is known with certainty and revealed in 
stage 3 (including externalities imposed). 
TREATMENT CREDENCE and TREATMENT THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION: participants are 
informed their payoffs may be lower if other buyers bought good B, 
consequently imposing an external cost on the other buyers in the same 
group. Externalities known for sure are calculated at the end of each period 
but actual externalities are only revealed at the end of the experimental 
session. 
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Table 4 Sessions overview 
 
 
  
Treatments # groups # subjects # sellers # buyers
CREDENCE 2 sessions *3 groups 36 18 18
THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION 2 sessions *3 groups 36 18 18
FULL-INFO 2 sessions *4 groups 48 24 24
Total 20 120 60 60
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Table 5 Share of green goods in proposals and purchases 
 
 
  
Treatment Actual Proposals Actual Market 
share
Perceived 
proposals
Perceived 
Market Share
CREDENCE 15.6% 10.3% 69.4% 63.6%
THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION 29.4% 25.8% 76.4% 76.2%
Only certified greens 25.3% 24.2%
FULL-INFO 31.9% 18.1%
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Table 6 Social welfare: benchmarks and actual outcomes 
 
  
TREATMENT CREDENCE # browns net social benefit
benchmark: all greens 0 18000
actual market outcome 319 14610
TREAT. THIRD PARTY CERTIFICATION # greens 
non-certified
# greens 
certified
# browns net social benefit
benchmark: all greens non-certified 360 0 18000
actual market outcome 6 87 266 15116
TREATMENT FULL-INFO # browns net social benefit
benchmark: all greens 0 24000
actual market outcome 390 19950
# greens
480
87
# greens
360
37
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Table 7 Panel data Logit model for the probability of seller selling at least one unit 
Notes: dependent variable: dummy variable for seller selling or not in a given period; Robust 
standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
TREAT 
CREDENCE
TREAT FULL-
INFO
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Proposed price -0.304*** -0.135*** -0.173** -0.334***
(0.0434) (0.0459) (0.0685) (0.0549)
Lowest competitors' price 0.332*** 0.175*** 0.198*** 0.331***
(0.0549) (0.0491) (0.0703) (0.0696)
Green good proposed (1:yes 0:no) 0.913** -0.0654 -0.485 0.964***
(0.465) (0.591) (0.535) (0.317)
Other green goods proposed (1:yes 0:no) -1.005*** -0.416 -0.229 0.00440
(0.371) (0.702) (0.675) (0.224)
Relative green reputation -0.0976 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.175***
(0.0933) (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0414)
Certification (1: yes 0:no) 1.612**
(0.762)
Constant -0.185 -0.576 0.0637 1.006
(1.484) (0.946) (1.000) (1.467)
Observations 360 360 360 480
Number of unique subjects 18 18 18 24
TREAT THIRD PARTY 
CERTIFICATION
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Table 8 Random effects panel regression of price paid by each buyer 
 
TREAT 
CREDENCE 
TREAT THIRD 
PARTY 
CERTIFICATION 
TREAT FULL-INFO 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Green good purchased (1: yes 0: no) 6.278*** 5.111*** 8.520*** 
(0.958) (1.980) (1.266) 
Green good purchased is certified (1: yes; 
0: no) 7.394* 
 (4.346) 
 Period -0.621*** -0.538 -0.299* 
(0.158) (0.386) (0.173) 
Constant 51.81*** 49.90*** 47.44*** 
 
(2.542) (3.417) (2.294) 
 Observations 356 359 477 
Number of unique subjects 18 18 24 
Notes: dependent variable: price paid for a good by a buyer; Standard errors in parentheses 
clustered by group; levels of statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Figure A. Screenshots for the experiment 
A1. TREATMENT CREDENCE: Input screens for sellers (Stage 1) 
 
A2. TREATMENT CREDENCE: Input screens for buyers (Stage 2) 
 
